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Abstract—Deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) can be
applied to malware binary detection through images classifica-
tion. The performance, however, is degraded due to the imbalance
of malware families (classes). To mitigate this issue, we propose a
simple yet effective weighted softmax loss which can be employed
as the final layer of deep CNNs. The original softmax loss is
weighted, and the weight value can be determined according to
class size. A scaling parameter is also included in computing the
weight. Proper selection of this parameter has been studied and
an empirical option is given. The weighted loss aims at alleviating
the impact of data imbalance in an end-to-end learning fashion.
To validate the efficacy, we deploy the proposed weighted loss
in a pre-trained deep CNN model and fine-tune it to achieve
promising results on malware images classification. Extensive
experiments also indicate that the new loss function can fit other
typical CNNs with an improved classification performance.
Keywords— Deep Learning, Malware Images, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks, CNN, Image Classification, Imbal-
anced Data Classification, Softmaxloss
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware binary, usually with a file name extension of “.exe”
or “.bin”, is a malicious program that could harm computer
operating systems. Sometimes, it may have many variations
with highly reused basic pattern. This implies malware binaries
could be categorized into multiple families (classes), and
each variation inherits the characteristics of its own family.
Therefore, it is important to effectively detect malware binary
and recognize possible variations [1], [2].
However, this is non-trivial but challenging. A malware
binary file can be visualized to a digital gray image [3].
After visualization, the malware binary detection turns into a
multi-class image classification problem, which has been well
studied in deep learning. One can manually extract features
from malware images and feed them into classifiers such as
SVM (support vector machine) or KNN (k-nearest neighbors
algorithm) to detect malware binaries through classification.
To be more discriminative, one can utilize CNN to automati-
cally extract features as Razavian et al. did in [4] and perform
classification in an end-to-end fashion. However, most deep
CNNs are trained by properly designed balanced data [5],
[6], while malware images dataset may be highly imbalanced:
some malware has many variations while some other only has
few variations. For instance, the dataset [3] used in our paper
contains 25 classes, and some class contains more than 2000
images while some other has only 80 images or so. As a result,
even reputed pre-trained CNN models [7], [8], [9], [10] may
perform poorly in our senario. Furthermore, pre-trained CNN
models are originally designed for specific vision tasks, and
they cannot be applied to malware binary detection directly.
One may argue that data augmentation could be a possible
approach to balance the data, such as oversampling the mi-
nority classes and/or down-sampling the majority classes. It
is, however, not suitable for our problem due to two reasons.
First, down-sampling may miss many representative malware
variations. Second, simply jittering the data cannot generate
images corresponding to real malware binaries. Therefore,
we aim to investigate how to train a CNN model with the
imbalanced data in hand.
To solve the above challenges, inspired by the work in [11],
[12] which designed new loss function for CNN to improve
training performance, we propose a weighted softmax loss for
deep CNN on malware images classification. Based on the
error rate given by softmax loss, we weight misclassifications
by different values corresponding to class size. Intuitively,
misclassification of minority class should be amplified, and
that of majority class needs to be suppressed. Our weighted
loss can achieve this goal and guide the CNN to update
filters in a proper direction. We adopt a pre-trained verydeep-
19 model [8] from VGG family (Visual Geometry Group at
Oxford), and retrain it to achieve a promising result on the
malware images classification. Once the proposed loss has
been proven feasible with VGG models, it can be extended
to other models, such as GoogleNet [9] and ResNet [10]. In
a word, the contributions of this work are two-fold. First, we
propose a weighted softmax loss to address the data imbalance
issue in CNN training. Second, we apply the proposed loss to
a pre-trained CNN model and fine tune it to solve the malware
images classification problem.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Related work is
discussed in Section II. Section III introduces the proposed
weighted softmax loss. In Section IV, we describe how to
deploy the proposed loss and fine-tune a deep CNN for
malware images classification. We evaluate our method in
Section V, and conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Malware Images: Nataraj et al. [3] proposed a way of
converting malware binaries into digital gray images. They
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(a) Malware image from family: Adialer.C
(b) Malware image from family: Skintrim.N
Fig. 1: Two sample malware images.
created 25 classes of malware images that are highly imbal-
anced. Two sample malware images from ‘Adialer.C’ class and
‘Skintrim.N’ class are shown in Fig. 1. Microsoft Malware
Classification Challenge1 also provides imbalanced training
and testing data which includes 9 classes only. Therefore, that
task is not as challenging as ours in terms of the malware
diversity (the dataset used in our work contains 25 classes).
Deep Learning: Deep learning recently gained remarkable
success in computer vision tasks. Krizhevsky et al. and their
work in [7] opened a new era for deep CNN and its application
on image classification. Many works have been inspired.
Simonyan and Zisserman proposed a very deep CNN in [8],
and they significantly improved the performance by increasing
the depth and using small convolutional filters of size 3 × 3.
Szegedy et al. [9] designed a 22 layers GoogLeNet which
increased the width of the network, and achieved the new state-
of-the-art performance for image classification. He et al. [10]
eased the training of a 152 layers deep CNN by presenting
a residual learning framework. Besides image classification,
deep learning has also been applied in fundamental image
processing tasks, such as denoising [13] and contour detection
[14]. Saxe and Berlin [15] discussed the feasibility of using
deep CNN on malware detection. Hand-crafted features such
as ‘PE import’ are extracted prior to the model training, which
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification
is not the typical manner of an end-to-end learning process.
Huang et al. proposed a quintuplet based triple header hinge
loss for extracting discriminative features from imbalanced
data in [12]. Nonetheless, their work requires features ex-
tracted in advance in a hand-crafted manner or by another
pre-trained CNN model. Meanwhile, clustering algorithm such
as k-means is needed prior to training. These steps were
not integrated into an end-to-end fashion like typical CNNs.
Recently, Xu et al. [16] have applied deep learning in medical
CT physics, and consider scatter correction also by designing
new loss function.
III. WEIGHTED SOFTMAX LOSS
In this section, we introduce how to weight softmax loss
according to class size.
A. Softmax Loss
Softmax loss is a combination of softmax regression and
entropy loss, used in multi-class classification problems. Given
a K-classes training set containing m images: {x(i), y(i)}
where x(i) is an image, and y(i) is the ground truth label
and y(i) ∈ {1, 2, ,K}. Let a(i)j (j = 1, 2, ,K) be the output
unit from the last fully connected layer of CNN, then the
probability that the label of x(i) is j can be given by
P
(i)
j =
exp(aij)∑K
l=0 exp(a
(i)
l )
(1)
Typical deep CNNs aim to minimize the entropy loss function:
J0 = − 1
m
{
m∑
i=1
K∑
j=0
1(y(i) = j)log p
(i)
j } (2)
where m is the batchsize, and K is the total number of classes
in the dataset. 1(.) is an indicator function. 1(true) gives 1,
and 1(false) gives 0. In typical CNNs, convolutional filters
are updated by stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm.
Traditional softmax loss treats misclassification of each class
equally, which is reasonable for balanced data, but will lead
to poor performance on imbalanced data classification, such
as malware images. The weighted softmax loss is proposed to
address this issue.
B. Weighted Softmax Loss
Our approach can be formulated as follows,
J0 = − 1
m
{
m∑
i=1
K∑
j=0
ωk ∗ 1(y(i) = j)log p(i)j } (3)
where ωk is a weight value determined by
ωk = 1 +
Smax − Sk
β ∗ Smax (4)
where k is the ground truth class label of the ith image. Smax
is the size of the largest class in the data set, and Sk is
the size of an arbitrary class k in the data set, and β is a
parameter that controls the scaling of the weighted loss. Our
empirical preference of β is 20. Extensive experiments about
this parameter will be shown in section V. It is worth noting
that the minority classes will be assigned a larger weight value
whereas the majority classes will be lightly weighted. The
weight value will not dramatically affect the loss, thus it can be
regarded as a subtle fine-tuning, that boosts the classification
performance as well as avoids overfitting. In practice, training
procedure only needs to choose a ωk according to the ground
truth label of the ith sample in the mini-batch.
IV. CLASSIFICATION BY CNN
In this section, we discuss how to fine-tune vgg-verydeep-19
model for malware images classification.
A. Network Architecture
Simonyan and Zisserman in [8] proved that classification
accuracy can be improved through going deep of the network.
Vgg-f model [17] contains 21 layers, whereas vgg-verydeep-
19 model contains 43 layers. Convolutional filters of size
3 × 3 are used in vgg-verydeep-19 model. They correspond
to smaller receptive fields, but are still able to extract discrim-
inative features. We fine-tune vgg-verydeep-19 model since
it outperforms other methods in vgg family on classification
task. Other pre-trained models, such as ‘vgg-face’, ‘fcn’, and
‘fast-rcnn’, were designed for tasks including face recognition,
semantic segmentation, and object detection. Therefore, the
availability of those methods on our problem has not been
further exploited in this work. In addition, Simonyan and
Zisserman [8] argued that the local response normalization
(LRN) [18] can be ignored in CNN. In order to boost the
classification performance, we add Batch Normalization (BN)
layer [19] between convolutional layer and ReLU (rectified
linear unit) layer. However, the very first convolutional layer
is followed by a ReLU layer directly, and the fully connected
layer is directly followed by a ReLU layer as well.
A big potential threat for deep learning is overfitting, espe-
cially when the training set is not large. Srivastava et al. [20]
invented ‘dropout’, a simple yet powerful approach to avoid
overfitting in CNN. Units in layers are randomly dropped and
the corresponding connections are also removed temporarily. It
works as randomly training the different networks in multiple
rounds. We place two dropout layers (with probability = 0.5)
between the three fully connected layers to prevent overfitting
(by default, the downloaded vgg-verydeep-19 model does not
contain dropout layer). In testing phase, the dropout layers will
be removed.
B. Weighted Softmax Loss Layer
We append the proposed loss as the last layer of our
model. The final structure contains 60 layers including the
added dropout layers and BN layers. For the purpose of
simplification, only the fully connected layers, and the added
dropout layers and the weighted loss layer are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Fully connected, dropout and the loss layers of our
fine-tuned CNN.
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes experiments showing the effective-
ness of our proposed loss on malware images classification.
Vgg-f,m,s models [17] are also used to validate the general fit
of the new loss function. We also analyze the value selection
of the scaling parameter and recommend an empirical option.
Top-1 validation error is utilized to evaluate the classification
performance.
Experiments are conducted on MatConvNet2 framework
[18], which is an open source library for deep learning
in matlab. One Nvidia Geforce TITAN X GPU is used to
accelerate the mini-batch processing.
A. DataSet and General Settings
The dataset [3] used in our work contains 25 classes which
are highly imbalanced. The name and the size of each class is
listed in Table I3. We partition the data as follows: the first 60%
images in each class are used for training, and the following
20% for validation, and the last 20% for testing. No additional
data augmentation method except mean value subtraction is
applied on each image.
B. Effects of the Weighted Loss
To validate the general fit, we deploy the proposed loss in
3 pre-trained CNN models: vgg-f,m,s. The default structures
are entirely preserved and the number of filters 1000 in the
last fully connected layer is changed to 25, which corresponds
to the 25 classes in the malware dataset. We retrain the three
networks, and the top-1 validation errors with and without the
weighted loss are shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen that our
method effectively decreases the top-1 validation error, and
keeps the curves stable. The test performances are illustrated
in Table II.
C. Fine-tune Vgg-verydeep-19 Model with the Weighted Loss
In order to achieve a better result, we fine-tune vgg-
verydeep-19 model as discussed in section IV. We initialize
the filter weights using MSRA [10]. The momentum is set to
0.9, and the training is regularized by weight decay with L2
penalty multiplier set to 0.0005 as suggested by Simonyan and
Zisserman in [8]. The learning rate is set to 0.0001, which is
our empirical best option. Dynamic adjusting is not considered
since our data size does not require many epochs to converge.
2http://www.vlfeat.org/matconvnet/
3http://old.vision.ece.ucsb.edu/spam/malimg.shtml
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(a) Vgg-f model
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(b) Vgg-m model
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(c) Vgg-s model
Fig. 3: Top-1 validation error of vgg-f,m,s models with and without weighted softmaxloss.
TABLE I: Names and sizes of the 25 imbalanced classes of
malware images (Img stands for Images).
No. Type Family Name # of Img
1 Worm Allaple.L 1591
2 Worm Allaple.A 2949
3 Worm Yuner.A 800
4 PWS lolyda.AA 1 213
5 PWS lolyda.AA 2 184
6 PWS lolyda.AA 3 123
7 Trojan C2Lop.P 146
8 Trojan C2Lop.gen!G 200
9 Dialer Instantaccess 431
10 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!I 132
11 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!E 128
12 Worm VB.AT 408
13 Rogue Fakerean 381
14 Trojan Alueron.gen!J 198
15 Trojan Malex.gen!J 136
16 PWS Lolyda.AT 159
17 Dialer Adialer.C 125
18 Trojan Downloader Wintrim.BX 97
19 Dialer Dialplatform.B 177
20 Trojan Downloader Dontovo.A 162
21 Trojan Downloader Obfuscator.AD 142
22 Backdoor Agent.FYI 116
23 Worm:AutoIT Autorun.K 106
24 Backdoor Rbot!gen 158
25 Trojan Skintrim.N 80
TABLE II: Classification accuracy on the test images.
Original loss Weighted loss
Vgg-verydeep-19 97.32% 98.63%
Vgg-f 94.48% 95.36%
Vgg-m 95.90% 96.39%
Vgg-s 96.23% 96.89%
Batch size is set to 80. We compare top-1 validation error
of the models with and without the weighted loss in Fig. 4.
As can be seen, the weighted loss effectively decreases top-
1 validation error compared to the original loss. In testing,
we remove the two added dropout layers, and the results are
listed in table 2. In the dataset, ‘Autorun.K’, ‘Malex.gen!J’,
‘Rbot!gen’, ‘VB.AT’, and ‘Yuner.A’ classes are from the same
pack (UPX-Ultimate Packer for eXecutables). However, we
treat them as individual families. Otherwise, the test error can
be further decreased.
Moreover, CNN can extract image features automatically.
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Fig. 4: Top-1 validation error of our fine-tuned vgg-verydeep-
19 model with and without weighted softmaxloss.
In our fine-tuned model, a 4096-dimensional feature vector
for an arbitrary image can be captured at layer 41 (the second
fully connected layer). We generate a feature map for each
malware class by extracting features for all images in that
class, and combining all feature vectors to form a matrix and
visualizing it. Therefore, the dimension of any feature map is:
n×4096, where n is the class size. Such a feature map can
reflect characteristics of the corresponding malware class. We
give the feature maps of 5 malware classes in Fig. 5. Since
the classes are highly imbalanced, n is different for each class.
To attain the best display effect, we use ‘imagesc‘ command
in matlab to visualize a feature map, which will automatically
scale the map.
D. Scaling Parameter
In Eq. (4), the parameter β is needed to compute the
weighted loss value. Empirically, 20 is the best option for β.
To show the influence of this parameter, we further investigate
three β values on the fine-tuned vgg-verydeep-19 model and
report top-1 validation error in Fig. 6. As can be seen, the
curve with β = 20 is smoother than the others and it also
converges at a lower error rate. It indicates that an appropriate
selection of β is also critical to the network training.
(a) Allaple.L (b) Adialer.C (c) Yuner.A (d) lolyda.AA 3 (e) Autorun.K
Fig. 5: Feature maps of 5 classes in the malware dataset.
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Fig. 6: Impact of the scaling parameter.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a weighted softmax loss for convolutional
neural networks on imbalanced malware images classification.
By imposing a weight, the classification error for different
classes can be treated unequally. The principle of weighting the
loss has very clear intuition, and our experiments have shown
its feasibility of working with existing CNN models. We also
fine-tuned vgg-verydeep-19 model with the proposed loss to
achieve a satisfactory classification result. In addition, we have
experimentally given an option of the scaling parameter β in
computing the weighted loss. It indicates that an appropriate
selection of this parameter is indispensable for the training
success.
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